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Abstract 
This thesis extends several traditional small open economy one-sector models 
by incorporating socially-determined rate of time preference. The discount rate 
depends on the economy-wide average consumption, which is a social factor taken 
as external by the representative household. 
The models discussed in this thesis include i) a series of small open economy 
models presented in Obstfeld (1981a, 1981b, 1982, 1990), ii) a small open 
economy model with non-flat (upward-sloping or downward-sloping) bond curves, 
iii) a small open economy model with capital accumulation, and iv) a closed 
economy growth model. 
The results obtained in this thesis can be summarized as follows, i) For 
Obstfeld (1981a, 1981b，1982)，s models, we find that when incorporating socially-
determined rate of time preference instead of the internally-determined one in the 
original models, saddle path results can still be obtained and the policy 
implications remain unchanged, ii) For the small open economy model with a non-
flat bond curve, saddle path result can be obtained when the bond curve is either 
upward-sloping or downward-sloping. However, indeterminacy can occur if the 
bond curve is upward-sloping, iii) For the model with capital accumulation, both 
permanent multiplicative and permanent addictive productivity shocks result in 
i 
current account changes, iv) For the closed economy growth model, it shows that a 
saddle path result is obtained when the discount rate is either an increasing or a 
decreasing function of average consumption. 
This thesis shows that, by using socially determined time preference, the 
discount rate is taken as exogenously given and one costate variable can be 
eliminated in solving the optimization problem. Hence, the system has one 
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1 Introduction 
This thesis explores the implications of the hypothesis that individual time 
preference is largely determined by the surrounding environment — that is, by 
social forces that are viewed as entirely external and cannot be controlled by 
individuals. We consider one-sector small open economy models by specifying 
the dependence of the discount rate on economy-wide average consumption, 
which is a social factor taken as external by the representative household. 
We focus on the implications of this hypothesis on macro economic dynamics 
and policy implications. 
The influence of social forces on individual time preference was high-
lighted by earlier classical economists. Remarkably, Rae, using an alternative 
expression "the effective desire of accumulation" for time preference, identi-
fies culture as a critical determinant of differences in time preferences across 
various economies: "The mass of the individuals composing any society, be-
ing operated on the same causes, and having similar manners, habits, and to 
a great extent feelings also, must approximate to each other, in the strength 
of their effective desires of accumulation" (1834, p. 198). 
In this thesis, we assume that the discount rate is determined by the aver-
age level of consumption in the economy. The representative household takes 
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economy-wide aggregate consumption as given and makes its decision accord-
ing to the aggregate variable. A representative household's time preference 
conforms to that of the society, and that no individual decision can have 
an appreciable effect on this external force. Such specification captures an 
important feature of actual individual behavior as people tend to be largely 
influenced by social norms. 
The models in this thesis stand in contrast to earlier models with endoge-
nous time preference, for example, in Uzawa (1968), where the discount rate 
is assumed to depend on internal variables, such as the representative house-
hold's own consumption. However, defining the dependence of individual 
time preference on a relevant aggregate variable (average consumption) rep-
resents a simpler and more tractable approach of modeling social and cultural 
influence. A significant advantage of this specification is that it dramatically 
simplifies the analysis. 
This thesis is not the only nor the first attempt to model individual 
time preference that is socially determined. Shi (1999) postulates that the 
individual discount rate relies on per-capita consumption habit and Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe (2003) assume that the discount rate depends on aggregate 
per-capita consumption in a model with endogenous labor supply. Also, 
2 
Drugeon (1998) examines a model with the discount rate depending on both 
individual and average consumption. 
We study setups with socially-determined time preference which are based 
on i) the models in Obstfeld (1981a, 1981b, 1982, 1990), ii) a small open 
economy model with non-flat (upward-sloping or downward-sloping) bond 
curves, iii) a small open economy model with capital accumulation (see, for 
example, Blanchard and Fischer (1989)), and iv) a closed economy growth 
model as in Das (2003). The results in our one-sector models are as follows. 
First, for Obstfeld (1981a, 1981b, 1982)'s models, we find that saddle-path 
results can still be obtained and the policy implications remain unchanged. 
Second, for the small open economy model with a non-flat bond curve, saddle-
path result can be obtained when the bond curve is either upward-sloping 
or downward-sloping. However, indeterminacy can occur if the bond curve 
is upward-sloping. Third, for the model with capital accumulation, both 
permanent multiplicative and permanent addictive productivity shocks result 
in current account changes. Finally, for the closed economy growth model, it 
shows that a saddle-path result is obtained when the discount rate is either 
an increasing or a decreasing function of average consumption. 
The structure of the thesis is as follows. Section 2 is an illustration of a 
3 
general small open economy model with socially-determined time preference. 
In Section 3，we study the models in Obstfeld (1982), Obstfeld (1981a) and 
Obstfeld (1981b). In Section 4, we examine a model with non-flat bond 
curves. In Section 5, we consider a small open economy model with capital 
accumulation as in Blanchard and Fischer (1989). In Section 6, in order 
to compare with the former small open economy models, we study a closed 
economy growth model and correlate the results with those in Das (2003). 
In each of these sections, the endogenous time preference is set to be socially 
determined. Section 10 offers concluding remarks. 
2 An Illustration with a Small Open Econ-
omy Model 
2.1 Review of Obstfeld (1990) 
In this subsection, we give a brief review of the small open economy model 
presented in Obstfeld (1990). 
In a small open economy, the economy cannot influence the world rate 
of interest, and the representative households can borrow and lend at the 
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given world interest rate or at an interest rate with a risk premium when the 
capital market is imperfect. 
Obstfeld (1990) uses the specification for time preference introduced by 
Uzawa (1968) and extended by Epstein (1987). In the specification, the 
discount rate is assumed to depend on individual consumption. 
The optimization problem faced by the representative household is 
m a x � u ( c t ) e ] � d s j t � 
Jo 
subject to 
k 二 rbt — ct 
where u{ct) is strictly increasing and strictly concave, S{ct) is the discount 
rate with 5'{ct) > 0. Ct is the individual consumption of the representative 
household, bt is bond holdings and r is the instantaneous real interest rate. 
The system can be described by the following three differential equations 
bt = rbt - Ct (2) 
k = {^ct)(l>t - u{ct) (3) 
5 
and 
. u'{ct) - S'(ct)(l)t],,. 
CF (4) 
where St 二 _ and 小^ 三圣亡已®* with 圣右 being the cost ate variable 
of S{ct). p is the rate of time preference and p(c,圣）=r = S(c) at the steady 
state. 
Since the system is three-dimensional, the analysis is difficult. Obstfeld 
(1990) uses geometric method to study the resulting three-variable dynamic 
system and then presents some applications of the model to anticipated dis-
turbances. 
2.2 A Model with Socially-Determined Time Prefer-
ence 
In this subsection, we propose an alternative specification for the rate of 
time preference. In particular, we assume that the discount rate depends on 
economy-wide average level of consumption. Unlike the specification in Obst-
feld (1990), here, our specification implies that the representative household 
takes the average consumption as an externality and hence as given. We can 
show below that the dimension of the system of differential equations can 
6 
be reduced by one, which makes the analysis much simpler. Moreover, the 
policy implications are the same as those in Obstfeld (1990). 
In the present setting, the representative household solves the following 
optimization problem 
POO 
max / (5) 
Jo 
subject to 
k = rbt - ct 
where Ct is the economy-wide average level of consumption and S{Ct) is the 
discount rate. We assume that 5{Ct) > 0, 5(Ct) is linear in Ct and 5'(Ct) > 0. 
The present-value Hamiltonian is given by 
U = u{ct)e 几 + - Ct) 
In solving the problem, the representative household takes the economy-
wide average level of consumption as given. First-order conditions are 
u [ctje = m (6) 
7 
At = - m (7) 
bt = rbt-Ct (8) 
along with the transversality condition. 
Note that in equilibrium, economy-wide average level of consumption and 
individual consumption are equal (i.e. Ct = Ct). By introducing a new cost ate 
variable, At = ；^亡已了。“^⑷)心’ the first-order conditions (6) and (7) become 
Act) = Xt (9) 
At = M咖)—r] (10) 
Therefore, the system can be described by the following differential equations 
- 總 [ 咖 H ( n ) 
k = rbt - Ct (12) 
In this setup, there are only two differential equations while in Obst-
feld (1990), one more differential equation of the costate variable is needed. 
Hence, in our model, the analysis is greatly simplified. 
8 
By linearizing around the steady state, we obtain the Jacobian matrix 
m m 
V -1 rj 
bt is the only predetermined variable. Since there is only one predetermined 
variable, negative determinant of the Jacobian matrix implies that a unique 
saddle path is still obtained as in Obstfeld (1990). 
Figure 1 shows the configurations of the phase diagram described by the 
equations (11) and (12). 
In order to investigate anticipated disturbances, we modify equation (12) 
as 
bt = rbt -Ct-et (13) 
where Ct is the lump-sum tax levied by the government. 
We examine the effects of an increase in tax and an increase in interest 
rate base on equations (11) and (13) and prove that the results are essentially 
the same as in Obstfeld (1990).i 
1 Obstfeld studies the disturbances that do not change the ct or & equations. First, an 
increase in the lump-sum tax levied by the government is analyzed. In order to examine 
9 
For a permanent tax increase, the h = 0 locus shifts to the right with 
the Ct — 0 locus unaffected. Consumption initially drops (to A) and then 
converges through S'S' to a new equilibrium with consumption back to its 
predisturbance level and assets level increased. For a temporary tax increase, 
consumption initially falls (to B) but later, the economy returns to the orig-
inal saddle path converging back to the original equilibrium (see Figure 2). 
For the effect of an increase in interest rate, we focus on the case of 
= — > 1 as in Obstfeld (1990).2 An increase in interest rate rotates the 
0 
bt = 0 locus anti-clockwise. A permanent increase in interest rate causes a 
consumption increase and an assets fall.^ Concerning a temporary increase 
in interest rate, after the interest rate decreases, the economy returns to the 
original saddle path (see Figure 3). 
In summary, all of the above results are the same as those obtained in 
the case on the b — c plane, he lets 小七—i^ipt) where '0'(ct) > 0, thus the Ct schedule 
changes to 
. [u'jct) — S'jctMct)] r r / , � i X 
ct 二 [ L 〃 ⑷ -八 e ^ c 』 { 水看 I r } 
The difference between Obstfeld (1990) and our model is that does not appear in our 
model as the discount rate is taken as exogenously given. Hence, equations (11) and (13) 
can be used without any adjustment. 
2In Obstfeld (1990), only the case of £<5 > 1 is discussed. It is because, with £s < 1, 
preferences are similar to the time-addictive preferences case. 
3 While Obstfeld analyzes the situation with the c — ( f ) plane, it is examined with the 
b — c plane here. The costate variable 4>尤 is not involved in the present analysis because the 
discount rate, depending on the average level of consumption, can be taken as exogenous. 
10 
Obstfeld (1990). 
In Obstfeld (1981a, 1981b，1982)，the Uzawa's (1968) transformation 
{At = S(ut)) is used and the number of state variables in the optimal control 
problem is reduced by one. Obstfeld (1990) modifies the method and uses 
an approach involving all the state variables, which are the assets and O^ 
where Qt =列Q) — r with S{ct) being the discount rate. The discount rate is 
taken back into account as a state variable, and this method would be better 
because when the state variable of discount rate is omitted, the system could 
not illustrate all the information of the economy. 
If the rate of time preference is assumed to be determined socially, that 
is, the discount rate depends on the average level of consumption, the dis-
count rate can be regarded as exogenous. Hence, the costate variable of the 
discount rate can be eliminated. In a model with socially-determined time 
preference, the system of differential equations has one dimension less in a 
justified manner and thus the analysis can be simplified. 
If the discount rate depends on individual consumption, it does not equal 
the rate of time preference, unless at the steady state. However, if the dis-
count rate depends on average consumption, it equals the rate of time pref-
11 
erence at any time, with both of them varying over time. 
Assume the optimization problem faced by the representative household 
is 
max r (14) 
Jo 
Assumption: 
(i) u{ct) is strictly positive and strictly concave, that is, u > O^u' > 
0,u" < 0; 
(ii) S(Ct) > 0 and S{Ct) is linear in Q; 
(iii) S\Ct) > 0. 
Here S(Ct) is the discount rate and Ct is the economy-wide average level of 
consumption. 
Although the discount rate is not constant, it depends on average con-
sumption which is taken as exogenously given by the representative house-
hold. The representative household accepts passively the social norms in its 
valuation of future happiness relative to today's welfare. 
The linearity assumption for S(Ct) in (ii) is adopted for the purposes 
of simplification and specificity. Condition (iii) states that the discount rate 
increases with per-capita level of consumption. High consumption level of the 
12 
overall economy induces the representative household to be more impatient 
toward future consumption. It captures the "keep up with the Joneses" effect 
of consumption externalities recently emphasized among other areas in the 
literature on asset pricing. 
An immediate implication of the above specification for the discount rate 
is that the representative household's subjective discount rate and rate of 
time preference are equal at any time. To see this, following Epstein (1987), 
define the (local) rate of time preference at time s as 
Ps = -g logt /s k=o (15) 
Us is the marginal utility of consumption near time 5, computed via the 
Volterra derivative^: 
Us = u'{cs) exp[- Jl5{Cy)dv 
Calculation reveals that 
4 If (5 depends on individual consumption, that is it is not exogenous in the manipulation, 
then it should be taken into account in the Volterra derivative. Prom Obstfeld (1990), 
Us = u'{cs) — 5'{cs)(l)s, where (j) is the costate variable of 5. 
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Ps = KCs) (16) 
which means that the rate of time preference and the discount rate are equal 
at any moment just as in the case of constant discount rate, but they both 
vary over time. 
This property of the model is in stark contrast to those of previous models 
with internally-determined time preference in which the two rates generally 
do not coincide, unless at the steady state, and the rate of time preference 
depends on an additional costate variable.^ In the absence of the extra 
cost ate variable, characterizing the equilibrium is considerably simpler here 
than in the Uzawa-Epstein type or Obstfeld type models. 
In each of the following sections, we consider a small open economy model 
with socially-determined time preference and we show that saddle-path re-
sults are still obtained. Moreover, the results of the policy implications are 
also similar to those obtained in the corresponding papers. 
5ln Obstfeld (1990), the rate of time preference, p^ = 5(Cs){l + 
~ 、 以 ( C s ) / ^ 卜 S i n c e it depends on the costate variable, (pg, it is not 
F(Cs) — (Cs)] 
equal to the discount rate. 
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3 Small Open Economy Models with Socially-
Determined Time Preference 
In this section, we consider a small open economy model with socially-
determined time preference and re-examine the macroeconomic dynamics and 
policy implications in Obstfeld (1981a, 1981b, 1982). Saddle-path results are 
still obtained and that the policy implications are the same. In Section 3.1， 
we extend Obstfeld (1982) by studying a small open economy model with 
socially-determined time preference and discuss the effects of terms-of-trade 
deterioration on the current account. We investigate the effects of terms-
of-trade deterioration on the current account when initial bond holdings are 
assumed to be zero, negative or positive. We also analyze a case of imper-
fect capital market. In Section 3.2, based on Obstfeld (1981a) and applying 
a socially-determined time preference, we examine the impacts of a foreign 
exchange intervention, changes in the money growth rate and changes in gov-
ernment consumption in a small open economy model of exchange rate and 
current account determination. In Section 3.3, we study Obstfeld (1981b) and 
apply socially-determined time preference to the model. Then we consider 
an unanticipated devaluation of the currency and an unanticipated increase 
15 
in the rate of devaluation.^ 
3.1 The Laursen-Metzler Effect 
Laursen and Metzler (1950) claim that depreciation augments the size of a 
country's deficit in the short run while Haxberger (1950) states that current 
account deficit is resulted from depreciation in a country under some assump-
tions. However, with a model of infinitely lived representative household, 
Obstfeld (1982) points out that terms-of-trade deterioration in a country 
leads to current account surplus, which contradicts to the findings in Laursen 
and Metzler (1950) and Harberger (1950). The main reason is that, in the 
so-called Laursen-Metzler effect, the household smoothes the path of its con-
sumption stream by reducing saving and spending when there is a worsening 
of the terms of trade, which causes a current account deficit. However, in 
the model of Obstfeld (1982), the unanticipated change in real income makes 
the household revise its lifetime consumption plan. Although the subsequent 
expenditure path may be smooth, there could be a sharp initial change in 
6 Concerning the manipulation of the models in the three papers, if the method in 
Obstfeld (1990) is used to examine the following three papers, a differential equation 
involving the costate variable of the discount rate is needed. However, if the rate of time 
preference is assumed to be determined socially, the costate variable can be eliminated. 
As a result, the system of differential equations has one dimension less and the algebra 
can be simplified. 
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spending so that domestic spending measured in domestic goods will grow 
higher to obtain the original utility level (Obstfeld 1982, p.263). 
Obstfeld (1982) analyses the effects of terms-of-trade deterioration by 
assuming initial bond holdings to be zero, negative or positive. In all of the 
above situations, current account surplus may be resulted. Obstfeld (1982) 
also extends the model to an imperfect capital market and shows that terms-
of-trade deterioration also leads to a current account surplus. 
In this subsection, we consider a small open economy model with socially-
determined time preference and analyze the same issue and we show that the 
results axe similar. 
The optimization problem faced by the representative household is 





V{p, c) ^ sup c” I pc^ + c" = c} 
U is assumed to be nonnegative, strictly increasing in both arguments, strictly 
17 
concave and twice continuously differentiable. c{ and c^ are the consumption 
of foreign goods and domestic goods respectively. V is the indirect utility 
function, bt is the bond holdings at time t, p is the price of foreign goods in 
terms of domestic goods, y is the family's (fixed) endowment of the domestic 
goods, and r is the international rate of interest. Ct is the economy-wide av-
erage level of consumption. S{Ct) denotes the discount rate and we assume 
that S'{Ct) > 0. 
The present-value Hamiltonian is given by 
n = V{p, 释 + + rM 
p 
The economy-wide average level of consumption is taken as given by the 
representative household. First-order conditions are 
Vce-/。t 补 抽 二 & (18) 
P 
At = -m (19) 
ht = ^ ^ + rht (20) 
P 
along with the transversality condition. 
18 
Note that in equilibrium, economy-wide average level of consumption and 
individual consumption are equal (i.e. Ct = Q). By introducing a new cost ate 
variable, At = /x^e-^o the first-order conditions (18) and (19) become 
K = - (21) 
P 
At = XtlS{ct) - r] (22) 
Thus, the system can be described by the following two differential equations 
~ = (23) 
= + (24) 
P 
By linearizing around the steady state, the Jacobian matrix is obtained 
- 1 
T 
\ p / 
bt is the only predetermined variable. Since there is only one predetermined 
variable and the determinant of the Jacobian matrix is negative, saddle-path 
result is obtained. 
19 
Figure 4 displays the configurations of the phase diagram described by 
equations (23) and (24) with the path SS being the unique convergent path. 
Then we review the effects of an unanticipated, permanent terms-of-trade 
deterioration on aggregate expenditure measured in domestic goods and the 
current account. First, it is assumed that initial bond holdings are zero. It 
shows that the terms-of-trade shift also requires a fall in the domestic-goods 
value of aggregate spending (to E') and a current account surplus is obtained 
as in Obstfeld (1982) (see Figure 5), which contradicts to the Laursen-Metzler 
effect. When the bond holdings are assumed to be negative, the result is also 
in contrary to the Laursen-Metzler effect. Aggregate spending initially falls 
to E', implying a current account surplus. Then the economy converges 
through S'S' to the new equilibrium (see Figure 6). If bond holdings axe 
assumed to be positive, spending increases with terms-of-trade deterioration 
and a current account deficit is impossible, (see Figure 7), as seen from Figure 
7, b increases to b'. This is also consistent with Obstfeld (1982). 
Obstfeld (1982) investigates an extended case by changing the setting 
into an imperfect capital market. He assumes that the cost of borrowing 
perceived by the home country is an increasing function of its indebtedness 
to the rest of the world, that is r'(bt) < 0. In our model, terms-of-trade 
20 
deterioration also leads to a current-account surplus from b to 6'(see Figure 
8), just as in Obstfeld (1982). 
Notice that when there is permanent terms-of-trade deterioration, ag-
gregate spending at the new equilibrium is always higher than the initial 
value. When bond holdings are assumed to be zero or negative, the initial 
response is a reduction in aggregate spending; however the initial response 
is an increase in aggregate spending when bond holdings are assumed to 
be positive. On the other hand, when the capital market is imperfect, the 
change in aggregate spending between the new equilibrium and the old one 
is ambiguous. 
3.2 Exchange-Rate Dynamics 
Obstfeld (1981a) discusses a small open economy model of exchange rate and 
current account determination. The study focuses on the influence caused by 
a foreign exchange intervention, as well as changes in the money growth rate 
and changes in government consumption. He shows that foreign exchange 
intervention has no real effects. But an increase in the money growth rate or 
an increase in government consumption results in a current account surplus. 
In Obstfeld (1981a), the discount rate S depends on both individual con-
21 
sumption and real money holdings {6[u{ct, TUt)]). However, in the present 
context, we consider socially-determined time preference with the discount 
rate depends on average consumption only.'' This subsection presents a model 
with socially-determined time preference and the policy implications we ob-
tain here axe the same as those in Obstfeld (1981a). 
The representative household solves the following optimization problem 
poo 
max / [？x(Ct)+7;(mi)]e-"^ 。*<^ (Cs)心dt (25) 
Jo 
subject to 
at = rat + n - Q - (iTt + r)mt 
where 
U (q, rrit) = u{ct) + v{mt) 
The functions u{-) and are nonnegative, strictly concave and twice con-
tinuously differentiable. at is the household's real assets at time t, r is the 
7 For simplicity, we assume that the discount rate only depends on average consumption 
here. We can extend to the case where the discount rate depends on both average con-
sumption and average money holdings. The result of this extended case would be similar 
to the result presented here. We consider an extended case in the next subsection. 
22 
world bond rate, Tt is net real transfer and irt is the expected inflation rate. 
Ct is the economy-wide average level of consumption, S{Ct) is the discount 
rate. Here we assume that 5'{Ct) > 0. 
The present-value Hamiltonian is given by 
H = [u{ct) + + …[��+ r^ - q - {irt + r)mt 
The representative household takes the economy-wide average level of 
consumption as given in solving the problem. First-order conditions are 
u,(ct)e-》s、ds = pt (26) 
幻'(mt)e-io'"^  ⑷办=…(TTt + r) (27) 
Ih = - m (28) 
dt = rat + r t-C t- (jh + r)mt (29) 
along with the transversality condition. 
Note that in equilibrium, economy-wide average level of consumption and 
individual consumption are equal (i.e. Ct = q) . By introducing a new cost ate 
variable,入t 二 /if*^ 。'"^ (亡…、the first-order conditions (26) and (28) become 
23 
y!{ct) 二 At (30) 
At = A讽cO - r] (31) 
Note the following relations 
M, = 7 (32) 
A mt , 、 
兀i = 石 = 7 (33) 
Pt rrit 
x{ct, m t ) 三 = TTt + r. (34) 
where Mt is nominal money holdings and 7 is the constant money growth 
rate. 
Prom equations (32), (33) and (34), we obtain 
mt = [y + r - x{ct, mt)]mt 
Assume that 
Tt ~ jmt + rR- g (35) 
24 
at 三 1+mt + Ft (36) 
r 
Tht Ft = y + rFt Tt - ct -兀胸 (37) 
where R is constant level of central-bank foreign reserves and g is the constant 
level of real government consumption per household, y is real output taJken 
to be exogenous and fixed and Ft is the real value of the family's foreign 
claims. 
Therefore, equation (29) can be transformed to 
Ft = y + r{Ft -\-R)-ct-g 
The system can then be described by the following three differential equations 
- 藉 [ 咖 H _ 
m = 7 + r ——TT-f 爪t (39) 
Ft = y + r{Ft + R)-ct-g (40) 
By linearizing around the steady state, we obtain the Jacobian matrix 
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f 婴、m 0 0、 
u " { c ) � ) 
负V'(7fl)U"(旬 讯 年 测 0 
( - 1 
whose determinant is 
det = r . [-5'{c) . m ^ ^ l < 0 
Obviously, one root of the matrix is r, so that there are two positive roots 
and one negative root, at is the only predetermined variable. Since there is 
only one predetermined variable, a saddle-path result is obtained. 
Figure 9 shows the configurations of the phase diagram described by 
equations (39) and (40) with a unique saddle point. 
We next discuss the effects of the macroeconomic disturbances. First, a 
foreign exchange intervention of purchasing foreign claims from the public 
with domestic money has no real effects as in Obstfeld (1981a). It is be-
cause the government budget constraint (35) is unchanged. This is similar 
to a transfer of interest-earning assets from the public to the central bank 
and at the same time increasing the nominal money supply, making each 
household's permanent disposable income unchanged. Such redistribution of 
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foreign claims between the public and the central bank does not change the 
TTit = 0 and Ft = 0 schedules. Hence, such intervention has no real effect.^  
However, an increase in the rate of money growth, 7 has effects. It may 
cause inflation and in turns raise the opportunity cost of holding money so 
the household consumes more. Therefore the mt = 0 locus rotates downwards 
and the Ft = 0 locus shifts to the right, attaining a new equilibrium/^ In 
the short run, consumption needs to decline to enhance a current-account 
surplus at the new equilibrium. And because real balances increases during 
the course of attaining surplus, real balances would fall initially and there 
is a depreciation of the exchange rate. The short-run effect of a decrease 
in consumption and a depreciation of the exchange rate are the same as in 
Obstfeld (1981a) (see Figure 10). 
Moreover, an increase in government consumption has the same results 
as in Obstfeld (1981a). If government consumption does not enter the utility 
function of the household, an increase in government consumption would 
lead to a current-account deficit at the initial level, and there is an initial 
leftward shift of the Ft = 0 locus. But the steady state values of consumption 
8 Prom the government budget constraint (35), foreign claims purchased from the public 
is returned as transfers. Hence, household's permanent disposable income does not fall. 
9 The long-run instantaneous utility of the household remains unchanged after the 
disturbance. 
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and real balances are not affected, as they are independent of government 
consumption. Also, the exchange rate must depreciate initially in order to 
have consumption, real balances and foreign claims to rise along the saddle 
path. The result is the same when government consumption enters the utility 
function and Uc and Ug are the same, where the utility function U(ct,mt,g) 
is u{ct,g) + v{mt)丄。(see Figure 11). When the money growth rate is zero, 
this situation is similar to a tax-financed increase in government spending. 
The result here contradicts to the standard Keynesian presumption which 
states that as there is a short-run fall in disposable income, private savings 
decreases, causing current-account deficit. It is because in the present setting, 
private savings must rise so as to attain back to the predisturbance private 
consumption level. 
3.3 Capital Mobility and Devaluation 
With perfect capital mobility and a crawling-peg exchange rate regime, Ob-
stfeld (1981b) explores some exchange rate policies in a small open economy. 
He argues that an unanticipated devaluation of the currency has no real ef-
10 When government consumption does not enter the utility function of the representative 
household, it is considered as wasteful. When it enters the utility function, it acts as a 
public good. 
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fects but an unanticipated increase in the rate of devaluation may cause a 
current account surplus. 
In this subsection, we examine a small open economy model with socially-
determined time preference where the discount rate depends on both average 
consumption and average real money holdings. We analyze the same issues 
and the results obtained here are similar to those in Obstfeld (1981b). 
The representative household solves the following optimization problem 
roo 
max / u�cu mt)e- n 叩s，Ms�ds肚 (41) 
Jo 
subject to 
dt = y rat Tt - Ct - {e r)mt 
where the function u is nonnegative, strictly increasing in both arguments, 
strictly concave and twice continuously differentiable. q is the family's con-
sumption and rrit is real money holdings, at is real assets at time t where 
at = bt + rrit and bt is real bond holdings, y is the economy's fixed output, 
r is the constant world interest rate, Tt is net transfer from the government 
and errit denotes the inflation tax on cash balances. Ct is the economy-wide 
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average level of consumption, Mt is the economy-wide average level of real 
money holdings.u 6{Cu Mt) is the discount rate. Here we assume that 
> 0 and 62 > 0. 
The present-value Hamiltonian is given by 
7i = u(ct, mt)e- + +�at + r^ - q - (e + r)mt 
The representative household takes the economy-wide average level of 
consumption as given. First-order conditions are 
= h (42) 
= + (43) 
fh = —m (44) 
a^  = y + rat + Tt- Ct — (£ + r)mt (45) 
11 As Mt represents nominal money holdings in Section 3.2, we use Mt to denote 
economy-wide average level of real money holdings here. 
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along with the transversality condition. 
Note that in equilibrium, economy-wide average level of consumption and 
individual consumption are equal (i.e. Ct = q). By introducing a new costate 
variable, At = ^ e first-order conditions (42) and (43) become 
Uc = At (46) 
li 爪= (£ + r)At (47) 
Prom equations (46) and (47), we have 
字 = ( … ) (48) 
Um-(£-h r)uc = 0 (49) 
Prom the implicit-function theorem, we have 
dlTl 一 ~UcUfnc + UmMcc〉• (5Q) 
'^ c^ mm —収m 冗 cm 
字 = ^ < 0 (51) 
Uc 以 mm — '^ m'^ cm 
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Thus, 
rrit = m(ct,£) 
where 
m�> Q and rrie < 0 
Hence, first-order condition (44) becomes 
At = At{(5[Q，m(ct, £)] - r} (52) 
Note the following relations 
at = bt + rrit (53) 
ft = bt + Rt (54) 
where Rt is central bank's real reserve holdings. 
Moreover, assume that anticipated transfers and actual transfers coincide 
丁 t = rRt + erut (55) 
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Therefore, equation (45) can be transformed to 
ft = y-\-rft- Ct (56) 
We consider the following two differential equations 
Ct = m{ct, £)] - r} (57) 
以CC 
ft = y-^rft- Ct 
By linearizing around the steady state, we obtain the Jacobian matrix 
/ u \ 
0] 
収cc 
- 1 r 
\ / 
whose determinant is 
li 
det = r . — + Sarric) < 0 
c^c 
ft is the only predetermined variable. Since there is one predetermined vari-
able, negative determinant of the Jacobian matrix implies a saddle-path re-
sult. 
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Figure 12 shows the configurations of the phase diagram described by 
equations (57) and (56) with the path SS being the unique convergent path. 
We then discuss the exchange-rate policies. An unanticipated devaluation 
of the currency has no real effects as in Obstfeld (1981b). The reason is the 
same, that is, in a framework of capital mobility, the excess demand for 
money creates downward pressure on the exchange rate. Then the central 
bank purchases foreign bonds and issues money until the real balances of the 
public is restored. 
For an unanticipated increase in the rate of devaluation, since this in-
crease in e raises the opportunity cost of holding real balances, consump-
tion increases and the (！；亡 二 0 locus shifts up as in Obstfeld (1981b).12 The 
new saddle path passes below the original equilibrium with an initial sharp 
fall in consumption. There is an initial postdisturbance equilibrium of a 
current-account surplus with consumption and foreign claims growing along 
the adjustment path (see Figure 13). 
12 At the steady state, we have (5[c, m(c, e)] — r = 0 
^ = 〉 0 
de + d^ruc ‘ 
This means that the steady state value of consumption increases when e increases. 
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4 Dynamics of a Small Open Economy Model 
with Non-Flat Bond Curves 
In this section, we investigate the dynamics in a small open economy model 
with socially-determined time preference and non-flat bond curves. In Sec-
tion 3, the interest rate is taken as exogenously given under a perfect capital 
market. In this section, we consider an imperfect capital market in which 
the interest rate depends on the aggregate bond holdings in an economy. 
The interest rate may increase or decrease with aggregate bond holdings. 
We study cases with a downward-sloping bond curve and an upward-sloping 
bond curve respectively.^ ^ 
The representative household solves the following optimization problem 
POO 
max / 也 (58) 
Jo 
subject to 
k = r{Bt)bt - Ct 
where q is consumption, Ct is the economy-wide average level of consump-
i3An upward-sloping debt curve used in the literature, such as Turnovsky (1999), is 
equivalent to a downward-sloping bond curve. 
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tion. bt is family's bond holdings, Bt is aggregate bond holdings, which the 
representative household is unable to influence. r{Bt) is the world interest 
rate. S{Ct) denotes the discount rate and we assume that S'{Ct) > 0. 
The present-value Hamiltonian is given by 
n = + - q] 
The representative household takes as given the economy-wide average 
level of consumption and the aggregate bond holdings. First-order conditions 
are 
u ' (c t )e—⑷心= (59) 
At = -IJ'Abt) (60) 
bt = r{bt)bt - Ct (61) 
along with the transversality condition. 
Note that in equilibrium, economy-wide average level of consumption and 
individual consumption are equal (i.e. Ct = Ct), aggregate bond holdings 
and individual bond holdings are equal (i.e. Bt = bt). By introducing a new 
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costate variable, A^  = / x ^ e - ^ o t h e first-order conditions (59) and (60) 
become 
u'{ct) = Xt (62) 
At = (63) 
Therefore, the system can be described by the following differential equations 
k 藉 [ 咖 H 秘 （64) 
bt = r(bt)bt - Ct (65) 
By linearizing around the steady state, the Jacobian matrix is obtained 
( m s ' i c ) 
、 - 1 + 
whose determinant and trace are given by 
det = • 聯 — 碰 - 藉 
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tT=^^6\c)-\-[r'(b)b + T{b)] 
u"[c) 
4.1 Case 1: r'{Bt) < 0 
Saddle-path result is obtained if [r'{b)b + r(6)] > 0. Note that both of the 
increasing rate of time preference and the downward-sloping bond curve are 
stabilizing factors. They reinforce each other to attain a stable steady state. 
The condition above means that interest income should never decrease when 
bond holdings increase so that r{b)b is an increasing function of b. This 
condition is satisfied when b <0. 
4.2 Case 2: r\Bt) > 0 
4.2.1 Saddle Path Result 
Saddle-path result is obtained if determinant < 0，that is, r'(b) < 6'{c) • 
r'(b)b + r{b)]. In this case, the stabilizing factor of an increasing rate of time 
preference dominates and thus generates stable dynamics. 
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4.2.2 Indeterminacy Result 
Indeterminacy happens if determinant > 0，that is r'(6) > S'(c) . + 
- u'(c) _ --
r(6)] and trace < 0, that is ",_、S'(c) < —[r'(b)b + r{b)]. In this case, 
w (cj 
the destabilizing factor of an upward-sloping bond curve dominates, so that 
indeterminacy occurs. Below, we provide an example. 
Let 
1 — (J 
收） = a C t + 77 
bt =和认Bt-l) . bt - Ct 
where a = S'{Ct) > 0 and ip - (； = r'{Bt) > 0. 
Hence, equations (64) and (65) can be rewritten as 
4 = £ ! [ * “ “ ) - a c t 1 ] (66) 
a 
bt = 如 - b t - c t (67) 
Note that in equilibrium, economy-wide average level of consumption and 
individual consumption are equal (i.e. Ct = Q)，aggregate bond holdings and 
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individual bond holdings are equal (i.e. Bt = bt) as before. At the steady 
state, we have 
- 喻 1 c = 
a 
= i = i^-y 
ijj onp 
Linearizing the system around the steady state, we obtain 
—ac 4> — V 
J11 = = 
CT cr 
. 机芒 V^ C(妙一r]) 
Jl2 = = 
a aa 
J21 = - 1 
J22 = bipq + ip 
= 功 
aip 
A numerical example for indeterminacy is 
7] = 0.0035，a 二 0.025，= 0.8, iJj = 0.0045, a = 0.01 
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The Jacobian matrix becomes 
^-0.1 0.0144、 
、一 1 0.0365〉 
whose eigenvalues are (-0.03175 + 0.0987013 i, -0.03175 — 0.0987013 i). 
Since both eigenvalues have negative real parts, indeterminacy happens. 
5 Investment and Saving in a Small Open 
Economy Model with Capital Accumula-
tion 
5.1 The Model 
In this section, we consider a standard small open economy model with cap-
ital accumulation (see, for example, Blanchard and Fischer (1989)). In this 
model, there are costs of installing investment goods. In particular, as in 
Blanchard and Fischer (1989), assume that it takes it[l+T(.)] units of output 
to increase the capital stock by i units. Here, we investigate the dynamics in 
a small open economy model with socially-determined rate of time preference 
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and capital accumulation.丄^ 
The representative household solves the following optimization problem 




h = H 
where 
T(0) 二 0’T'(.) > 0 and 2T'(-) + ^ ^ > 0 
and Ct is consumption, bt is bond holdings at time t, r is constant world 
interest rate, it is investment, Ct is the economy-wide average level of con-
sumption. 
S{Ct) denotes the discount rate and we assume that 6'{Ct) > 0. 
14In this thesis, a differential equation of per capita debt used in the literature is changed 
to a differential equation of bond holdings for ease of interpretation and consistency with 
previous sections. 
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f(kt) is the production function where kt is the capital stock. 
The present-value Hamiltonian is given by 
n = + 从丫bt + f{h) -Ct-it[i + T(老m + mth 
In solving the problem, the representative household takes the economy-
wide average level of consumption as given. First-order conditions are 
i / ⑷ ⑷ 心 ( 6 9 ) 
ih = —m (70) 
1 + 哈 （ 7 1 ) 
h 二 it (73) 
^ = -鎖 h) + ( | m | ) ] (74) 
Prom equations (74) and (70), we have 
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‘ =rqt - I f i h ) + (75) 
Note that in equilibrium, economy-wide average level of consumption and 
individual consumption are equal (i.e. Ct = q). By introducing a new costate 
variable,入亡=^^e-^o the first-order conditions (69) and (70) become 
u'ict) 二 入t (76) 
At 二 A浙(Ct) - r] (77) 
Equation (71) implies that the rate of investment (relative to the capital 
stock) is a function that only consists of qt, which is the shadow price of 
capital in terms of consumption goods, q = with 屯 '> 0 and 屯(0) = 1. 
Define (p{-) as the inverse function such that | = ip(q), (p' > 0 and (^(1) = 0. 
Therefore, the system can be described by the following differential equations 
kt = it = kMqt),州）=0 (78) 
qt = rqt — f{kt) - ifi(qtfT'l^{qt)] (79) 
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bt = rbt + f{kt) -Ct- ktip{qt){l + T[^{qt)]} (80) 
Ct = ^ M c t ) - r ] (81) 
By linearizing around the steady state, we obtain the Jacobian matrix 
( 0 V ( i ) 0 0 \ 
—/"(幻 r 0 0 
爛 - M l ) r -1 
0 0 0 榮 作 
\ u"(c) 7 
u'(c) 0 V ( l ) 
The eigenvalues include r > 0 and < 0. As det = 
収 � - f ' ( k ) r 
kip'{l) • f"(k) < 0’ there are two negative roots. Since there are two prede-
termined variables, h and bt, we have a unique saddle-path result. 
As the steady state values of k, b and c are unique, they do not depend 
on their own initial values, which is different from the case with constant 
discount rate. 
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5.2 Productivity Shocks 
Define the production function be (1 - zo)f{kt) - Zi as in the standard model 
where zq is the multiplicative productivity shock and zi is the addictive 
productivity shock. In Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2, we analyze the effects of a 
multiplicative productivity shock and an addictive productivity shock on the 
current account respectively” 
5.2.1 A Permanent Multiplicative Productivity Shock 
An adverse permanent multiplicative productivity shock means that zq in-
creases. We show that this results in a current account surplus in our model 
as in the standard model. 
At the steady state, we have from equations (79) and (80)， 
^ 二 , 肉 _ (82) 
dzo (1 - zo)nk) ) 
0 = r5 + [(1 - zo)f{k) 一 - S-\r) (83) 
Therefore, from equations (82) and (83), we have 
i5Here，we assume that the production function is (1 - zo)f{kt) - zi by following the 
notations in Blanchard and Fischer (1989). 
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a - 、 — ( 1 - : 。 謂 他 ： 。 
dzQ r 
In the standard model, an adverse multiplicative productivity shock, i.e. 
an increase in zq, affects investment. In the present setting with socially-
determined time preference, an increase in Zq also affects investment in the 
economy and thus leads to a current account surplus. The reason is that when 
there is an adverse multiplicative productivity shock, the marginal product 
of capital decreases, i.e. (1 — zo)f{kt) decreases, thus investment decreases 
and capital stock decreases, leading to a current account surplus. The result 
is the same as in the standard model. 
5.2.2 A Permanent Addictive Productivity Shock 
The standard model suggests that the current account is unaffected by an 
adverse permanent addictive productivity shock. However, in the present 
model, a current account surplus is resulted. 
In the setting of constant time preference, an adverse addictive produc-
tivity shock has no effect on the marginal product of capital and hence no 
effect on investment and capital stock. Prom the following equation, 
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[ c t e - ^ ' d t = 厂 { ( 1 — zo)f{h) + T(老)]}e-〜力-bo (84) 
when Zi increases, consumption falls by exactly the same amount. As output 
also decreases by the same amount, savings and investment are unchanged 
and the current account is unaffected. 
However, equation (84) does not appear in the present context, as the 
rate of time preference is not constant. In our model, the steady state values 
of k, b and c are unique, and they do not depend on their own initial values. 
Hence, our result is different from that in the standard model. 
Prom equation (83), we have 
db 1 。 
F 二 - > 0 
ozi r 
Note that per capita GDP and GNP are given by 
GDP = (1 - zo)f{kt) -
GNP 二（1-2；0)/⑷一之1 + 咖 
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and saving is equal to GNP minus consumption 
Saving = GNP - consumption = (1 - zo)f{kt) 一 + rbt — Q 
As changes in Zi do not affect investment, saving and consumption, an in-
crease in zi causes an increase in bt, and there is a current account surplus. 
6 Saddle-Path Stability of a Closed Economy 
Growth Model 
We present a closed economy growth model with socially-determined time 
preference in this section as a comparison to the former small open economy 
models. Das (2003) specifies the discount rate to be a decreasing function 
of individual consumption, i.e. 6'(ct) < 0. She argues that such specifi-
cation does not necessarily result in instability of the dynamic system. In 
this section, we also obtain saddle-path stability in our model with socially-
determined time preference. 
The representative household solves the following optimization problem 
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max f ⑴ vict)e-!&够s、ds办 (85) 
Jo 
subject to 
k = fih) -nkt-Ct 
where Ct is the economy-wide average level of consumption, 5{Ct) denotes 
the discount rate, h is the per capita capital stock at period t and population 
is growing at a constant rate, n.^ ® 
In Das (2003)，the specification 6"{ct) > 0 is imposed in order to ensure 
non-negativity of In fact, such restriction can be relaxed and let 5{') 
to be a linear function. For simplicity, we assume that is linear without 
changing the property. 
The present-value Hamiltonian is given by 
n 二 & + fitUih) — nkt — Ct] 
The representative household takes the economy-wide average level of 
consumption as given. First-order conditions axe 
16 Apart from the standard neoclassical properties of continuity, concavity and con-
stant returns to scale, f{kt) satisfies the Inada conditions, limfc—o/'(fct) = oo and 
limfc—oo/'(A;t) = 0. 
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u'{^ct)e-兑似 = h (86) 
i^ t = -[f{kt)-n]fi, (87) 
kt = f(kt) - nkt - Ct (88) 
along with the transversality condition. 
Note that in equilibrium, economy-wide average level of consumption and 
individual consumption are equal (i.e. Ct 二 Q). By introducing a new costate 
variable, Xt == /x^e儿* 咖 t h e first-order conditions (86) and (87) become 
u'(ct) = Xt (89) 
人 — 讽 c O - 綱 + 71] (90) 
Therefore, the system can be described by the following differential equations 
二 ⑷ - n - % 0 ] (91) 
— u � � 
kt = f(kt) - nkt - Ct (92) 
By using socially-determined time preference, the system is reduced to 
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only two differential equations while in Das (2003), one more differential 
equation of the costate variable is needed. Thus, in the present setting, the 
analysis is considerably simplified. 
At the steady state, we have 
f'{k) - n = (5[/(句—n句 (93) 
By linearizing around the steady state, the Jacobian matrix is obtained 
、 - 1 m - n j 
whose determinant is 
u"[c) 
6.1 C a s e 1: 5丨(Ct) > 0 
If S'(Ct) > 0, the determinant is negative and saddle-path result is obtained. 
Figure (14) shows the configurations of the phase diagram described by equa-
tions (91) and (92) with 6'{Ct) > 0. There is a unique saddle point. 
In the present context, the saddle point is obtained without any restric-
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tions. The reason is that, the RHS of equation (93) is inverted U-shaped 
while the LHS is monotonically decreasing. As they are opposite sloped at 
the intersection point, there must be only one equilibrium. 
In our model with socially-determined time preference, 6'{Ct) > 0 is a 
stabilizing factor while in the standard model (see, for example, Blanchard 
and Fischer (1989)), assumption 6'{ct) > 0 is needed for stability. In our 
model, S'{Ct) > 0 is a conceivable assumption and it captures the "keep up 
with the Joneses" effect of consumption externality. 
6.2 Case 2: < 0 
With 6'{Ct) < 0, the representative households in the society want to distance 
themselves from the other representative households. When the present con-
sumption in the society is high, the representative households tend to save 
more, which is they don't imitate the people in the s o c i e t y " 
If 6'(Ct) < 0, the determinant will be smaller than zero as long as f"{k) < 
This means that saddle-path result can only be obtained when the 
slope of the line representing the LHS of equation (93) must be greater than 
that of the curve representing the RHS in absolute term at the intersection, 
i7ln Shi (1999)，there is also a comparison between (5'(-) > 0 and < 0 under a 
context of per-capita consumption habit. 
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that means the LHS intersects the RHS from above. Figure (15) exhibits the 
configurations of the phase diagram described by equations (91) and (92) 
with S'[Ct) < 0. There is one stable saddle point B and one unstable steady 
state A. 
As in Das (2003), a destabilizing factor appears here. Similarly, as long 
as the benefit from additional investment decreases at a faster rate than the 
cost of saving, saddle-path stability is obtained. 
In the present setting, there still may exist multiple equilibria as in Das 
(2003) when 8'{Ct) < 0 but there is only one equilibrium when 8'{Ct) > 0. 
7 Conclusion 
This thesis explores the hypothesis that individual time preference is largely 
determined by social norms which is entirely external and cannot be con-
trolled by individuals. We discuss setups with socially-determined time pref-
erence which axe based on i) the models in Obstfeld (1981a, 1981b, 1982, 
1990)，ii) a model with non-flat bond curves, iii) a small open economy model 
with capital accumulation (see, for example, Blanchard and Fischer (1989)), 
and iv) a closed economy growth model. In the one-sector models, the dis-
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count rate is assumed to depend on economy-wide average consumption. We 
focus on the implications of this hypothesis on macroeconomic dynamics and 
policy implications. 
The results in our models are summarized as below. For Obstfeld (1981a, 
1981b, 1982)’s models, we show that saddle-path results can still be obtained 
and the policy implications are the same. If we apply the method in Obstfeld 
(1990) to the models in Obstfeld (1981a, 1981b, 1982)，one more differential 
equation of the cost ate variable is needed. However, using a model with 
socially-determined time preference makes the analysis much simpler. For the 
small open economy model with non-flat bond curves, a saddle-path result is 
attained when the bond curve is either upward-sloping or downward-sloping. 
However, indeterminacy can occur if the bond curve is upward-sloping. For 
the model with capital accumulation, both permanent multiplicative and 
permanent addictive productivity shocks lead to current account changes. 
For the closed economy growth model, a saddle-path result is obtained when 
the discount rate is either an increasing or a decreasing function of average 
consumption. 
It is important to note that, the assumption in the present setting is 
reasonable. With the discount rate depending on social norms, each repre-
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sentative household is affected by the consumption behavior of other repre-
sentative households in the society with the influence being an externality. 
Apart from providing an alternative specification for the rate of time prefer-
ence, the models with socially determined time preference in this thesis axe 
much simpler than the original ones as one costate variable can be eliminated. 
The models in this thesis (small open economy models with socially-
determined time preference and the closed economy growth model with socially-
determined time preference) could be used and extended in various ways. 
First, they can be modified as one-good or two-good models and applied to 
study the impacts of various shocks. Second, they could be extended to cases 
with endogenous labor supply. In addition, each model could be converted to 
a two-country world model in a way suggested by Devereux and Shi (1991). 
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Appendix 
Figures for Section 2.2: A Model with Socially-Determined Time Preference 
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Figure 1. Dynamics of Consumption and Bond Holdings 
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Figure 2. The Effects of an Increase in Tax 
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Figure 3. The Effects of an Increase in Interest Rate 
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Figures for Section 3.1: The Laursen-Metzler Effect 
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Figure 4. Dynamics of Consumption and Bond Holdings 
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Figure 5. The Effects of Unanticipated, Permanent Terms-of-Trade 
Deterioration when Initial Bond Holdings is assumed to be Zero 
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Figure 6. The Effects of Unanticipated, Permanent Terms-of-Trade 
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Figure 7. The Effects of Unanticipated, Permanent Terms-of 
Trade Deterioration when Initial Bond Holdings is assumed to be 
Positive 
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Figure 8. The Effects of Unanticipated, Permanent Terms-of-
Trade Deterioration in an Imperfect Capital Market 
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Figures for Section 3.2: Exchange-Rate Dynamics 
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Figure 9. Dynamics of Real Money Holdings and Bond Holdings 
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Figure 10. The Effects of an Increase in the Rate of Money 
Growth 
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Figure 11. The Effects of an Increase in Government Consumption 
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Figures for Section 3.3: Capital Mobility and Devaluation 
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Figure 12. Dynamics of Consumption and Stock of Claims on Foreigners 
Owned by the Country 
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Figure 13. The Effects of an Unanticipated Increase in the Rate 
of Devaluation 
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Figures for Section 6: Saddle-Path Stability of a Closed Economy Growth Model 
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Figure 14. Dynamics of Consumption and Capital in a Closed Economy 
with S'>0 
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